This chapter discusses two main topics: distributing the functionality of an arbitrary trusted third party (TTP) from a stand-alone machine to an application running on a secure execution environment on a user's machine, and the specific example of distributing the functionality of a certification authority (CA) in this way. TTP services that are distributed in this way have potential advantages in terms of easing the computational load on the central TTP server and in the flexibility of placement of the service within a network.
Introduction
A trusted third party (TTP) is an entity in a network that is trusted to provide some security service to the other users of that network. Some examples of the use of trusted third parties in secure systems include key generation and distribution, electronic notarisation, and digital archiving. Typically, a TTP service is offered by a single (or small number of) dedicated machines that have strong security counter-measures installed to prevent the TTP's service from being compromised. This centralised approach is easy to manage, update and test.
The use of a trusted third party in a security system is almost always based on a business agreement. The users trust the TTP because they know any attempt the TTP makes to subvert or make malicious use of the service that it offers will result in violation of the business agreement. If the TTP service is being offered by a company then this could involve the contract to run the TTP service being cancelled and the business sued. If the TTP service is being offered by some internal entity within a company then the manager of that entity will have to explain the reason for the deviation from the security policy.
There are a couple of problems that are typically associated with traditional TTPs. The first is that, by their very nature, a TTP provides a static, centralised point of attack. For example, an attacker can compromise a whole public key infrastructure by compromising the CA that issues certificates for that infrastructure. The second is that, in many cases, the TTP will need to be constantly online and will often have to deal with large volumes of traffic quickly. This may cause a "bottle-neck" in the system and impact system performance. The combination of these two problems make TTPs a tempting target for attackers wishing to launch a denial of service attack.
Another problem with traditional TTPs is their placement within a network. Once a TTP is placed within a network topography, it may well be infeasible or impossible to change its location. This can be disadvantageous for ad-hoc or rapidly changing network topographies, such as wireless or mobile networks, as the TTP can quickly become difficult to reach.
One particular, widely discussed, example of a trusted third party is a certification authority (commonly known as a CA). Certification authorities aid in the deployment of public key cryptography by attesting to the fact that a given public-key belongs to the user who claims it. A CA does this by issuing certificates which contain information about a public key's owner, the validity period of the public key and the situations in which the public key can be used (the public key's policy). These certificates are digitally signed by the CA to prevent unauthorised modification or impersonation. The Handbook of Applied Cryptography [16] attributes the concept of a certification authority to the 1978 thesis of Kohnfelder [14] . More information about public-key infrastructures and certification authorities can be found in [1] .
Secure Execution Environments
For the purposes of this chapter, we will assume the existence of a highly resilient secure execution environment (SEE). The SEE has a hardware protection mechanism which differentiates it from other protected execution environments, such as the Java sandbox. This distinction is important as we require an additional level of protection to be afforded to cryptographic secrets which cannot be provided by any other means. It is generally considered good practice to store cryptographic keys within protective hardware [2] . We also assume that, for all practical purposes, the SEE cannot be influenced or impersonated and should never leak any information about the application that it is running 1 . As we can see from previous chapters this is an idealised assumption, and neither the Microsoft Next Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) or the Trusted Computing Group's Trusted Computing Platform makes any such strong claim. However, by abstracting the notion of a secure execution environment we can concentrate on the theoretical uses of such an environment rather than on unenlightening technical details.
We therefore define a secure execution environment as a logically separate computing environment with certain security properties, which can be trusted to execute programs securely even when the environment is hosted by an untrusted machine. In particular, we envisage the SEE as having the following three main characteristics:
• It can demonstrate to a third party that it has been initialised correctly and is ready to receive an application. This could be done by various means, such as the SEE providing evidence that a proper boot sequence has been executed or by demonstrating knowledge of some secret that only the properly configured SEE has access to.
• It can execute applications supplied to it by a third party in a secure manner, without any other application having access to the downloaded application or the data which it produces, or the downloaded application having access to any other application or data on the host machine.
• It can demonstrate to a third party that an application has been successfully executed by the SEE. This can be done explicitly or implicitly.
In the explicit case, the SEE provides some kind of proof that a known series of commands has been executed. An example of this is the Platform Configuration Register (PCR) mechanism used by the Trusted Computing Group [9, chap. 13-14] . In the case of an implicit proof, the SEE could load an application in a confidential manner and then produce a result that could only be obtained by the SEE executing that application. An example of this kind of implicit demonstration will be given in Section 3.
Essentially an SEE provides an environment in which a third party can install a "black box" application on a user's machine without compromising the security of that application.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of distributing a central TTPs functionality to an application running on a user's secure execution environment, and suggest a general method on how this could be done. The idea of distributing a TTP service onto a SEE under the control of the user is not entirely novel -it has already been discussed in Chapter ??? for Single Sign-On Servers -but we believe that this is the first time the general model has been stated. We will then concentrate on the idea of using a distributed CA to aid certificate management (Section 3) and discuss the real-world applications of such an approach (Section 4). Lastly we will discuss some new problems that arise from using this technique (Section 5).
Distributed Trusted Third Parties
Functionally, a trusted third party service can be thought of as a secure, tamper-proof black-box that is trusted to perform some functionality. From this point of view, it is easy to see that it is unnecessary for the TTP service to be hosted on a machine that is physically separated from the user's machine. Two of the reasons why these services have traditionally been hosted on physically separate machines are that:
• Having a distinct physical location may aid the functionality of the TTP. It may, for example, be convenient to have a single point of reference for a network-wide service or it may be necessary for the service to interact heavily with a resource (such as a backup device) and, hence, be convenient to locate the service near that device.
• It is easier to secure a TTP service as a secure tamper-proof black-box when the service is running on a physically separate machine on which the attacker is assumed to have no privileges.
The first of these reasons depends only on the nature of the functionality that the TTP service is offering. The second is becoming less of requirement with the advent of secure execution environments. The central thesis of this chapter is that it is possible to delegate most 2 TTP services to a TTP-applet running in a secure execution environment on a user's machine. Instead of requesting a service directly from a central TTP, a user would request that a TTP-applet be downloaded into the user's machine's SEE, where the applet could be executed and provide the requested service. The advantage of this is that (potentially) the applet could offer the same service multiple times with little or no interaction from the TTP. We have already seen an example of a TTP-applet replacing a Single Sign-On server in Chapter ???.
Typically, a TTP-applet would be downloaded and executed in a six stage process:
1. The user authenticates itself to the TTP and requests a service to which it is entitled.
2. The TTP would verify the authenticity of the SEE. If the SEE is not authentic then the TTP will refuse to provide the service.
3. The TTP establishes a shared key with the SEE using a key establishment protocol. This key will enable the TTP-applet to be downloaded confidentially and integrally.
4. The TTP encrypts and uploads the TTP-applet to the SEE. Along with the encrypted TTP-applet, the TTP must provide some assurance that that applet is authentic (i.e. data origin authentication).
5. The SEE decrypts the applet and checks that is authentic.
6. The SEE executes the applet and provides the service to the user, along with a proof that the applet was executed successfully.
It may be thought that data origin authentication might be insufficient to provide security in step 3 -after all, the TTP may download malicious code into the user's machine at this stage. This is misleading: the TTP has no more power then it had when it executed the service on a stand-alone machine because the applet which provides the service is operating in the SEE and is unable to access any other resources on the user's machine. Further attempts to use the TTP service could be handled directly by the TTP-applet running on the user's machine. The applet would only need to contact the central TTP directly if it was unable to offer the correct service on its own, or if the applet's policy dictated that it should do so.
Advantages and disadvantages
The technique has several potential advantages (which will depend on the nature of the service the TTP is offering). Possibly the most important is the flexibility of placement that the distributed TTP approach offers. Since a distributed TTP can be downloaded and executed on the SEE of any machine in a network topography, it is possible to dynamically place the TTP service within an evolving network so that it is in the best position to offer its service to that network's users. This is particularly useful for networks whose topography changes rapidly, such as for personal area networks [20] and personal distributed environments [8] .
A second important advantage is the potential for decreased traffic at the central TTP. This should speed up the operation of the system by removing the TTP "bottle-neck". As the central TTP is only required to download the initial applet, and possibly, updated versions of the applet, the user is likely to have fewer interactions with the central TTP. Also, if the TTP service has a high computational overhead then distributing the service to the user's machine may ease the computational burden placed on the central TTP.
Another potential advantage is that the decentralised nature of the TTP service might make the service more difficult to attack: an attacker might have to attack many different TTP-applets in order to compromise the security of the system in any breadth, and this may be detectable or preventable.
Alternatively, an attacker may choose to attack the central TTP that distributes the TTP-applets. However, this may not be enough to compromise the existing functionality of the system if the compromise of the central TTP does not compromise any of the existing TTP-applets. For this to be the case, the TTP-applets would need to be able to function independently of the central TTP. An example of this might be a TTP-applet which provides a confidentiality service. If the central TTP does not keep copies of any secrets given to each TTP-applet, after an applet has been distributed, the central TTP cannot impersonate that applet at any point in the future.
The technique also has several potential disadvantages (again, depending rather heavily on the nature of the service that the TTP is offering) and most of the potential disadvantages mirror the potential advantages. The first is based on the distributed nature of the TTP-applets. By having the applet running on the user's machine, it may become easier for that user to attack the TTP service and compromise the security of the system. However, the severity of compromising a user's TTP-applet can be minimised by using forward and backward secrecy techniques to protect any sensitive data contained in the applet (see, for example, Diffie, van Oorschot and Wiener [7] for details of forward secrecy in key exchange protocols or ISO/IEC 18031 [12] for details of forward and backward secrecy in random number generators).
Also, if the TTP-applet could not be designed to function independently of the central TTP, then the communication between central TTP and TTPapplets could provide a means of attacking the TTP-applets. If the TTP was to be compromised this could, depending on the nature of the service, lead to the attacker having base from which they could attack all current TTP-applets. As a result, it would be desirable to design the link between TTP and TTP-applet in order to minimise such exposure.
Another potential disadvantage involves the fact that many TTP services need to be continually offered. It might be important that a user's TTPapplet is always available to the surrounding network, in which case the applet must be hosted on an 'always-on' machine. Of course, if an entity on the network were to find that a user's TTP-applet was unavailable, they may always have the option of querying the central TTP for the service directly, but this can lead to synchronicity problems.
Distributed Certification Authorities
We now describe a distributed certification authority applet (CA-applet). The CA service is particularly suited to being distributed. Traditionally, the service has to deal with large volumes of traffic at the TTP and is a common target for denial of service attacks. Distributing the CA service onto the user's machine helps ease both of these problems. Furthermore, technical advances in the field of digital signatures mean that PKIs are being seriously considered for use in ad-hoc networks, such as personal area networks [17] . Thus, the ability to dynamically place a CA within a network could be seen as a great advantage.
The CA-applet concept
The basic idea of a CA-applet is that the user's machine hosts the certification authority that certifies that user's own public keys. This CA-applet will actually fulfil two roles: (1) it will certify new public keys that belong to that user, and (2) it will make these certificates available to other network users. The former stops the user from having to communicate with the TTP whenever it wishes to produce a new public key (a user may wish to do this for key separation purposes or if it is responsible for multiple public keys, e.g. if the user is an e-mail server). The latter stops the traffic "bottle neck" at the directory service that hosts the public key certificates 3 .
One unusual advantage of distributed CA-applets is that they may be hosted on a machine which gives an implicit assurance that the correct CA is being used. For example, an e-mail server could host a CA-applet for public encryption keys. If such a system is being used then a user will always know the location of the CA that certifies a certain e-mail address -it is the e-mail server that hosts that address.
CA-applets vs. Sub-CAs
There are many similarities between a user running a CA-applet and running a sub-CA that has been certified by the central CA. The main difference between these two situations is in the level of trust that has to present between the central CA and the user. For a user to run a CAapplet, the central TTP merely has to trust the user's initial authentication and SEE. For a user to run a separate CA certified by the central CA, the central CA has to trust that the user is capable of correctly installing and maintaining a full CA. The central CA has to also trust the user not to abuse the power they have to create certificates. This obviously means that the CA has to extend a much higher level of trust.
It is possible to limit the trust that a central CA needs to place in a sub-CA running on a user's machine by specifying policies in the certificate that the central CA issues to the subordinate. For example, the central CA may specify a policy that states that the subordinate CA's public key can only be used to verify certificates issued to a particular identity. Hence, the subordinate CA can only issue certificates to one entity. This seems, on the surface, to offer the same functionality as a CA-applet without the need for a secure execution environment. However, there are a few subtle differences.
Since the subordinate CA is not running in a secure execution environment, the user can extract the CA's private signing key and create a certificate valid in his name for any public key without having to prove that the user knows the corresponding private key. This is not possible with CA-applets. Secondly, the use of policies places the security burden on the verifier, who must recognise the policy and correctly check it before trusting a certificate. The use of CA-applets places the security burden on the issuer who will only provide a CA-applet after checking the policies associated with issuing certificates to the recipient of that applet.
CA-applet functionality
In this section we will describe the different functions that a CA-applet should offer. We consider this to be a minimum set: a CA-applet could conceivably offer significantly more functionality than listed.
Initialisation
The CA-applet is initialised when it is first downloaded. This begins with the user authenticating itself to the central CA and requesting the applet. We assume that the user has pre-registered his identity with the certification authority by means of a registration authority.
The central CA then generates the CA-applet. This applet would have the power to produce certificates for public keys that are registered to those identified within the scope of the policy that the CA issues with the applet. In order to do this, the central CA would generate a new key-pair for use within the CA-applet. These keys would be certified by a certificate signed using the central CA's key-pair for applet issuance. This certificate would be also be implanted into the CA-applet and would also show the validity period for the CA-applet's key-pair (which can be relatively short).
The CA-applet would be downloaded into the SEE in exactly the same method as any other TTP-applet. The central CA would check the authenticity of the SEE, then the central CA and the SEE would execute a secure key establishment protocol. Finally, the central CA would deliver the applet to the SEE in a secure manner using this key, i.e. with confidentiality, integrity and data origin authentication.
Registering a public key with a CA-applet
Only the user to which the CA-applet has been issued should be able to register a key with the CA-applet. To do this the user must authenticate itself to the CA-applet in some way. This could be done either explicitly, through the use of some authentication protocol, or implicitly if the SEE authenticates users before allowing them to access processes which they own.
Whenever a user wishes to register a public key with a CA-applet, the user must provide the applet with the public key to be registered and proof that the user possesses the corresponding private key (along with any other supplementary information). If this proof is deemed correct then the applet creates a certificate that certifies that the given public key belongs to the user. Optionally, the CA-applet may also register that public key with the central CA, either for backup purposes or to provide an additional distribution method.
Note that the need for the CA-applet to produce a proof that it has been executed correctly has been removed. This proof is provided implicitly by the production of a signed certificate. This is because we trust the central CA to provide a trustworthy applet, and only that applet can produce a signature using the key-pair authorised by the central CA -hence, the presence of a valid signature is proof that the applet has been successfully executed. We believe that offering a more explicit proof (for example, the use of PCR values within TCG [9, chap.13&14] offers no greater protection than our implicit proof. This is because it is likely that an attacker that has managed to compromise the SEE in order to access the private key could also modify the PCR values. In order to achieve this equality between explicit and implicit proofs, we assume that the download phase provides adequate protection for the confidentiality of the private key. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption to make, otherwise the security of the system as a whole is flawed.
Requesting a public key certificate from a CA-applet This service must be publicly available. If the SEE only allows users to access processes which they own, then it will be necessary for a separate, publicly available process (outside of the SEE but belonging to the user) to provide access to this service to other users.
On request, the CA-applet will output the certificate for a public key that it has certified. It will also, on request, output the certificate for its own public verification key that was certified by the central CA.
Hence, whenever a network user wishes to find a certificate for a user's public key, the network user need only contact the user's host machine to receive the certificate from the CA-applet. If the CA-applet is unavailable then the network user may (optionally) request the certificate from the central CA or wait for the CA-applet to come online again before completing the task.
Potential problems with CA-applets
There are a range of problems associated with the use of PKIs and CAapplets. In this section we discuss the main problems and suggest some solutions.
The revocation problem
One of the ways in which a CA-applet may also be useful would be in easing the traffic problems associated with certificate revocation. The two main approaches to certificate revocation are the use of certificate revocation lists (CRLs) and online checking methods such as OCSP [13, 18] . Each of these approaches have problems.
The problems associated with online approaches such as OCSP are that they require highly available TTPs to verify the status of a certificate. The status of a certificate is likely to be checked on a regular basis, and some policies might dictate that a check is required every time a signature is verified. Thus, the TTP which answers certificate queries must be capable of dealing with a heavy traffic load. This problem can be significantly eased if the CA-applet were also to verify the status of certificates it has issued. Each CA-applet would then only be responsible for verifying the (relatively small number of) certificates it has issued.
Similarly, if CRLs are used, a CA-applet could also be responsible for storing certification revocation lists. It would be an easy job for the CAapplet to keep accurate CRLs for the (again, relatively small number of) certificates for which it is directly responsible.
However, for both these solutions to work effectively we have to assume that the CA-applet is going to be highly available. If the CA-applet is ever unavailable to the network then it could be necessary for a network user to wait until the applet came online again before completing their task.
We believe that there are several ways in which we can overcome this potential problem. It may be possible to allow the central CA to mirror the CA-applet's revocation responsibilities, however this approach may not be practical due to synchronicity problems.
Another solution would be to have peer-to-peer replicated distribution of the revocation information. The source CA-applet could nominate a set of other CA-applets to which it could periodically send revocation updates. The client could then poll the broader set of CA-applets should the source be unavailable.
It may also be possible for the client requesting the revocation information to continue processing in lieu of the CA-applet coming back on-line. However, this solution would only work in support of applications which could effectively roll-back the transaction should the client eventually receive confirmation that the certificate had been revoked.
The renewal problem
The private certification key issued to a CA-applet by a central CA must have a limited lifespan -indeed, it might be better for security reasons if this lifespan were quite short. The shorter the lifespan of a private key pair in a CA-applet, the less time an attacker has to attempt to compromise the CA-applet's private key or to abuse the system if the CA-applet is compromised. After this time, or if it is suspected that the private key has been compromised, the private signing key of the CA-applet will need to be renewed.
The simplest method to cope with the expiration of the private signing key would be for the CA-applet to simply delete itself. After this time, should the CA service still be required, the user can re-install the CA-applet by contacting the central CA and downloading a new version complete with a new private signing key. Of course, if this approach is used naively then there is a problem: certificates issued using the old signing key will no longer be valid and the user will need to re-certify all of his public keys.
This problem can be avoided if the CA-applet informs the central CA that its private key is about to expire. The CA-applet (with the user's permission) could then download a new CA-applet to be run in a separate area of the user's SEE. This new CA-applet could re-certify all the public keys that the old CA-applet has certified.
Of course, there is no need for a new CA-applet to be downloaded at all if the CA-applet contains a mechanism for updating its own key-pair and requesting a new certificate from the central CA. However, such an approach has the disadvantage of allowing a single CA-applet to continue running indefinitely. In this case, if that CA-applet is compromised, and that compromise isn't detected, then the entire security of the part of the system which relies on the CA-applet could be indefinitely compromised 4 .
Compromise of a CA-applet
The most disastrous event that can occur whilst using a CA-applet, apart from the compromise of the central CA, is that a CA-applet would be compromised. This would allow an attacker to extract the private signing keys and forge certificates for any combination of public key and identity. It is important to limit an attacker's advantage in this case.
An easy first step is to only certify the CA-applet's private signing key for relatively short periods of time. This means that if an applet is compromised then the attacker will only have a limited amount of time in which to forge certificates. Furthermore, it may be possible to isolate those certificates that have been signed using the compromised key and revoke them. If the CA-applet registers the certificates that it issues with the central CA then the central CA could create some kind of "certificate history" that records a certificate's creation date. Any certificate that was created whilst a compromised key was in use would need to be revoked, however all other certificates would still be valid.
Another solution would be to use multiple CA-applets. Here, every public key that is submitted to one CA-applet would automatically be submitted to a second applet (running in distinct execution environments, either on the same machine or on a physically separate machine). If a single CA-applet is compromised then it will be easy to isolate those certificates that have been forged as they will not have a corresponding second certificate issued by the second applet 5 . Of course, as with any system that involves multiple CAs, the problem with this approach is one of synchronicity between the applets -both applets must be "up-to-date" with each other or the system would be open to abuse.
Another option to limit the effects of CA-applet compromise is for the central CA to only certify the applet to carry out tasks conforming to a given policy. For example, the applet could be limited to creating certificates for a named individual. If this applet is later compromised then the keys contained within the applet can only be (mis)used within the scope of the policy statements identified within the applet's certificate.
Applications
It is clear that there are risks associated with using a distributed CA over a traditional, static, central CA, and the distributed approach may not be appropriate in all situations. In this section we aim to highlight a few situations where we believe a distributed CA may be useful.
Personal certification authorities
A personal certification authority [10, 17] supports the distribution and use of public keys in a personal area network (PAN) [20] or a personal distributed environment (PDE) [8] . Mitchell and Schaffelhofer [17] list the following functional requirements for a personal CA:
1. The personal CA key pair can be securely generated within the device, or securely generated and transferred to the device, and (in both cases) the private key is securely stored when in the device.
2. The root public key of the personal CA can be securely transferred to those devices that will have to verify certificates issued by the personal CA.
5. No third party passive interceptor of communications can learn any secret information.
6. No third party active interceptor of communications can manipulate the exchanges between the mobile device and the personal CA so that a public key certificate is created for an incorrect device or that contains incorrect data.
7. For securing the transfer of the personal CA root certificate from the personal CA device to another mobile device. The interaction between a mobile device and a personal CA shall use at least a 'weak' shared secret and the method of this use should be capable of resisting 'brute force' attacks on the shared secret.
It is easy to imagine a distributed CA architecture that satisfies or exceeds all of these requirements: consider a situation where a manufacturer or distributor implants a public verification key into each device. This would allow that manufacturer (or their representative) to offer authenticated software to these devices. In particular, the manufacturer could offer a CAapplet for which it has vouched -in other words the manufacturer could act as a central CA by making a CA-applet available, but would not fulfil any of the traditional functions of a certification authority. This would allow the mobile device to act as a verifiably secure CA. The manufacturer would, of course, need to generate the certificate that certifies the CA-applet's master key. Also, several manufacturers could cross-certify each other's public verification keys to ensure that the CA-applet could be used with a range of different devices.
This distributed CA-applet would even offer the optional and desirable functionality described in [17] in that the security-critical CA functionality would be removable, personal, transferable and verifiable.
Indeed, this service not only meets all of the above requirements, it also offers some attractive additional features. For example, the transfer of the CA service from one CA-applet to another could be done in a fully secure manner without needing to resort to the use of user interaction or 'weak' secrets. A CA-applet would merely need to be executed on a second machine and that applet would need to certify all the existing certificates.
Furthermore, a CA-applet has the advantage of being configured by security experts (i.e. the manufacturer) rather than by the user, and would allow a user to demonstrate to a third party that two devices belong to the same PAN or PDE. A user can prove this to a third party because the user does not know the private signing keys that the CA-applet is using and is therefore unable to abuse them. This is contrary to the way that personal CAs have previously been envisaged, where the personal CA's private keys have always been known to the user.
Ad-hoc networks
We believe that ad-hoc networks could provide a suitable environment in which to make use of CA-applets. Proposals for providing distributed certificate services within ad-hoc networks already exist [15, 21, 23, 24] . CA-applets could be used to either compliment, enhance or provide an alternative solution to previous work. In existing designs, the mobility of the CA signing functionality is seen as important. The CA-applet could provide this mobility by offering a useful means of handing-off CA functionality between different SEEs.
The applicability of CA-applets to ad-hoc networks will, by necessity, depend on the environment in which the ad-hoc network is being used. CA-applets would appear to be more suited to situations in which ad-hoc networks happen within, or in conjunction with, a more permanent security infrastructure. This is not an onerous assumption to make, and is already noted by Varadharajan et al. [21] in their work.
We now outline some of the existing proposals for certificate management architectures for ad-hoc networks. In the process, we briefly discuss the significance of their designs in light of our proposals:
• Varadharajan et al. [21] propose a security service for cluster-based Near-Term Digital Radio (NTDR) [22] ad-hoc networks:
-Their work makes use of a permanent CA for setup that would be off-line most of the time. In their discussion, they note that not all ad-hoc networks are completely without infrastructure. They use examples where the nodes in the network will have prior access to more long term certificate services before forming the ad-hoc network.
-They highlight that, within NTDR, moves between clusters (localised groups of nodes within the network) are rare, but that changes within the cluster can happen more often. They make use of this fact to develop a two tier key hierarchy, one within a cluster and one between clusters. This results in a more efficient key management architecture.
-In their design the hand-off of security state between clusterheads (the leader responsible for administration within a cluster) can occur with notification (where the existing clusterhead hands over the security state to the new cluster) or without notification (where the outgoing clusterhead doesn't hand over the security state and new state needs to be configured). In the case where notification is used, we believe that CA-applets and the secure download protocols provide an ideal mechanism for securing the transportation of this security state from the old to the new clusterhead.
• Zhou and Haas [23] propose a distrubuted means of generating signatures on certificates.
-They replicate their key management service by using threshold cryptography. There are a number of special nodes within their network who generate partial shares of a signature. These partial signatures are then combined to generate a valid signature. This allows for a proportion of servers to be unreachable or corrupt, while still allowing for the generation of secure signatures.
-If nodes in the network are progressively compromised, then an attacker could feasibly collect enough secret key shares over a long period of time. To defend against this possibility they employ a share refreshing technique. This reduces the time-frame in which an adversary must compromise the required threshold of servers.
• Luo and Lu [15] propose a similar mechanism to Zhou and Haas of distributed certificate management within ad-hoc networks. Their proposal differs in that all nodes are equal and there are no special server nodes.
-In a similar manner to Zhou and Haas, Luo and Lu employ threshold sharing of a certificate signing key and use proactive share refreshing to guard against the accumulative long term compromise of nodes.
-Their scheme employs a local trust model where any k nodes in the ad-hoc network can form a coalition to perform certificate management operations. 6 While this allows the infrastructure to be more flexible, it does make it more difficult to enforce a global policy across the ad-hoc network. This may or may not pose a problem depending on the environment in which the network is being used.
-Their share update mechanism uses a randomised algorithm to start the share update process. We believe that this could potentially create problems if the ad-hoc network was subject to partitioning.
-Their design principle is based on the assumption that the network provides no support to the security architecture. 7 This differs from Varadharajan et al's [21] assumption that some ad-hoc networks can rely upon long term infrastructure intermittently. 6 The value for k is set to be one greater than the anticipated number of nodes which might be compromised at any one time. This means that corrupt nodes cannot form a group large enough to perform valid operations.
7 Their standard bootstrapping protocol does rely upon a trusted dealer to issue shares to the first k nodes. However, they have an enhanced protocol which can do without this dealer by performing distributed generation of an RSA key pair.
-They identify several problems that a globally trusted centralised CA would present within an ad-hoc network. Here are some of the problems they highlight with centralised CAs: centralised CAs are not scalable and are single points of compromise which makes them targets for denial of service attacks; high mobility makes it more difficult to contact a centralised CA in a timely fashion. We believe that a CA-applet mechanism could counter these particular problems in some scenarios.
We now overview what we believe to be some of the potential benefits of using CA-applets for certificate management within ad-hoc networks:
• When compared to other certificate management mechanisms CAapplets could provide a stricter form of centralised policy enforcement when compared to current designs. In some of the current designs [15, 21, 23, 24] the decision to issue a new certificate is based on the consensus of a certain threshold of nodes in the network. While this adds robustness to the overall scheme, it makes it more difficult to issue policies that should be globally adhered to. A CA-applet version of this, while possibly having less resilience, could enforce certain policies dictated by a global CA through the protection of the SEE.
• The use of CA-applets could augment the security of current schemes which use pre-emptive share refreshing for threshold cryptography. The use of specialised protective hardware should reduce the chance of compromise. Thus, we can extend the time period required between runs of the share refreshing protocols, hence reducing the communication overheads.
• Short-lived and/or local certificates could offer an important advantage in certain types of ad-hoc networks. A CA-applet which managed certificates that were local to a subset of the ad-hoc network would allow for a more decentralised security management architecture. Clusterbased ad-hoc networks (such as NTDR [22] ) are examples of an ad-hoc network technology which could benefit from such local certificates.
Distributed registration/certificate data preparation
User registration is an important element in most PKI architectures. In many PKIs the registration of users (where an individual has to verify their identity, usually in person) is commonly carried out by a Registration Authority (RA), which is a separate entity to the CA. The two main reasons for separating the functionality into a CA and RA are: running a CA often involves specialist technical and security expertise; the decision to register an individual within a PKI, and hence the corporate security infrastructure, is usually a business decision, not a technical decision. This separation of duties often leads to the CA being hosted by a specialist security service provider, with the registration being carried out at the client organisation's site.
We believe that CA-applets can deliver extra functionality to the resulting link between the CA and RA. By using an SEE, we are making use of hardware protection for what is an important link in the certification process. In addition, the security of this link is under the direct control of the technical specialists, i.e. the CA. For example, the confirmation of a registration could be signed locally by the CA-applet, before the certification request is transmitted to the CA for the generation of a new certificate. Assuming that the client trusts the SEE and download protocol, a CA-applet potentially allows the CA to have more control over the security set-up of the CA-RA link. This would allow the RA to concentrate on the actual registration process.
As well as helping secure the link between the CA and RA, we believe that the use of CA-applets could help with certificate data preparation. In the case where signature generation at the CA becomes a performance bottleneck, it is always possible to purchase more signature generation hardware. However, we are aware of scenarios where data preparation for the certificate content was the bottleneck in certificate generation. In such cases, the nature and location of the data prior to certification can sometimes be a factor in reducing this bottleneck. We believe that using a CA-applet could allow for a partial certificate to be prepared at the RA before final transmission to the CA to complete the process. By using a CA-applet we are still making use of a protected environment for certificate generation. This could potentially alleviate some forms of throughput problems by utilising the distributed nature of many registration infrastructures.
Also, the CA-applet could, if need be, provide a subset of CA functionality in order to reduce some of the central CA's certificate maintenance tasks. For example, any changes to certificate content could primarily be handled at the RA before being transmitted to the CA for final validation. Such techniques could allow a system to be designed such that the CA would be off-line for longer periods of time, hence reducing the exposure to attack.
Short-lived certificates
Short-lived certificates are (unsurprisingly) certificates whose validity period is very short -sometimes measured in hours or minutes. These certificates are supplied without any kind of framework in place to tell the user if a certificate has been revoked. Instead, the relying party accepts the risk that a certificate may be issued for a public key which has been revoked. However, the relying party is assured that the public key can only be used in an unauthorised manner for a very short period of time.
The main problem associated with traditional implementations of shortlived certificates is that they require the CA to continually re-certify public keys -the shorter the window available to an attacker to abuse a revoked public key, the more frequently the CA is forced to re-certify public keys.
A distributed CA could easily help mitigate some of the problems associated with using short-lived certificates without severely compromising security. The use of a CA-applet would remove the need for the central CA to continually re-certify public keys, allowing the user's own machine to perform the re-certification calculations. As the CA-applet would only be issuing certificates that are valid for short periods of time, the central CA is given the option of only certifying the private signing keys held by the CA-applet for a short period of time too, thus minimising the dangers involved with a compromised CA-applet.
Lightweight PKI
The cost of building a PKI is one of the contributory factors to the relatively small uptake of PKI within industry. Installing the hardware required to meet the demands of running a fast and consistently on-line service only adds to the costs. We believe that, in certain scenarios, use of CA-applets could provide a more lightweight PKI which reduces the cost of implementing an infrastructure. In addition, this could allow PKIs to be deployed in environments where traditional PKIs are ineffective.
We believe that making use of CA-applets to distribute the CA functionality can provide the benefits of asymmetric cryptography without having to build the heavyweight infrastructure traditionally associated with PKI. We have seen examples where more lightweight infrastructures are used in practice for security services such as key distribution. In some examples this has been used effectively to replace physical couriers. Such infrastructures often use hardware security modules to provide a secure environment. It is our belief that extending such practices to SEEs, as they become more common in the future, could widen the areas in which a PKI is considered to be a solution.
We believe that services which do not relate to the security of a user within a system are best placed to make use of a lightweight PKI. A large part of providing the "bells and whistles" in a PKI can be attributed to user registration and maintenance within the PKI. If, for example, the PKI was used to support end-to-end key setup for link encryption, we believe that using a CA-applet could significantly reduce the cost of implementation.
As SEEs become more prevalent, this would allow us to use the SEE to provide a distributed means of bootstrapping a PKI that was tailored to a very specific task.
Supporting web services
Secure web services [19] are reliant on the use of a PKI to provide the security. For Internet applications, there is unlikely to be the support of a wide-scale PKI. Certificate usage in the Internet is primarily limited to server-side SSL certificates. The lack of a PKI from which a client can make use of an identity certificate is likely to hamper the deployment of secure web services.
We believe that delivering CA-applets to the client's SEE can allow a limited extension of the server's security domain on to the client's machine. This technique would allow the server to calculate the risk associated with the transaction supported by the web services and tailor the CA-applet's functionality accordingly 8 . This effectively allows the client to self-certify within the server's security domain, albeit with a very limited scope. Thus, the CA-applet furnishes us with a simple means of supporting secure services from the server's end.
What this provides us with is a more closed security model, where the service accepting the risk is acting as CA and relying party in the same transaction model. This method of closing the loop by reducing the number of players in a transaction can be seen in the new BACSTEL-IP system [4] . Similar methods to this are also discussed in Gutmann's assessment of PKIs [11] .
Multiple certificate authorities
The use of multiple CAs has been proposed to solve certain problems in dynamically evolving networks [17] . In particular, their use has been proposed to solve problems related to the compromise of a CA and to ensure that a CA service is 'always-on'. However, the dynamic nature of the network may mean that it is difficult to install a CA in the most convenient position, or that it would be most advantageous to install a CA on an untrustworthy machine.
The use of a distributed CA would allow the central CA to place one or more CA-applets in the best positions within the network in an ad-hoc fashion. Furthermore, the central CA could install such an applet on any machine with a suitably secure execution environment.
Future directions
There are several ways in which the ideas in this paper can be extended. The obvious option is to examine other types of TTP service in order to see if they could be effectively deployed as distributed TTPs. For example, it might be interesting to investigate the possibility of distributing a timestamping service to a secure execution environment with a tamper-proof clock. The other way in which the ideas in this paper can be extended is to examine how to deal with the inherent problems in the distributed TTP architecture. Of these, the biggest problem is probably the synchronicity problem associated with using multiple TTPs.
Multiple TTPs
At several points in this paper we have suggested that using multiple TTPs or TTP-applets might be useful. Indeed, the idea of two or more CA-applets on different machines offering the same service is particularly attractive. It helps solve the 'always-on' problem (which is especially useful when the machines in question have limited connectivity, such as mobile phones or PDAs). It is useful when dealing with the compromise of a CAapplet and allows the ad hoc distribution of the CA service in a dynamically changing network (assuming that a CA-applet has the ability to distribute further CA-applets).
However the use of multiple TTPs, and multiple CAs in particular, has a problem with synchronicity. In many situation each TTP-applet, and the central TTP, should have access to the same data (certificates, revocation lists, etc.) as all of the others or the system could (potentially) be abused. Obviously, the use of a central storage facility would solve this problem but would also re-introduce many of the problems that TTP-applets are designed to avoid! Hence, for a network to effectively use multiple TTP-applets, it seems that some kind of point-to-point update protocol would have to be designed.
Conclusion
We have proposed a novel way of delegating a TTP service from a central TTP to a secure execution environment running on a user's machine. We have shown that this may have significant advantages for some types of TTP service and, in particular, have shown that it may be a useful technique for solving some of the problems traditionally associated with certification authorities.
